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Pruitt: United States v. Kennedy

NOTE
AN ARGUMENT FOR CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY VICTIM RESTITUTION
IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT: UNITED

STATES v. KENNEDY

AMBER PRUITT*

INTRODUCTION
The production of child pornography is big business. 1
Internationally, the creation and distribution of child pornography results
in more than three billion dollars per year in revenue. 2 Moreover,
approximately two thirds of arrests for Internet-related sex crimes in the
United States are for the production and possession of child
pornography. 3 These statistics attest to the fact that child pornography
continues to be a serious problem. 4 The frequency with which people

* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco,
California; B.A. 2009, Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA. I would like
to thank those who spent countless hours helping me to develop and edit this paper, especially Sarah
Einhorn and Kate Baldridge. I would also like to thank my friends and family. Your love and
support mean the world to me.
1
Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Untangling Child Pornography from the Adult
Entertainment Industry: An Inside Look at the Industry’s Efforts To Protect Minors, 44 CAL. W. L.
REV. 511, 513 (2008).
2
Id.
3
See JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY MITCHELL, & DAVID FINKELHOR, INTERNET SEX CRIMES
AGAINST MINORS: THE RESPONSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 17 (2003), available at
www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV70.pdf.
4
Id.
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continue to view child pornography is disturbing because this thriving
industry is built on the exploitation of children. 5 Victims of child
pornography are sexually abused, 6 and this abuse is filmed or
photographed. 7 A single image of child pornography will often be
reproduced and shared among offenders, usually online, 8 so that
strangers may constantly view images of the victim’s sexual abuse in
what amount to crime-scene photos. 9 Once uploaded, these images can
never truly be removed from the Internet. 10 The existence of such
images exacerbates the trauma of the original sexual abuse. 11 Victims
must also deal with the risk that offenders who view the images may
seek to contact them 12 or use the images to groom other children for
future sexual abuse. 13 This may sound like a nightmare, but it is a reality
for many survivors of abuse. 14
In response to the proliferation of the child pornography industry,
possessing child pornography has been criminalized in many countries
around the world. 15 This response is not solely due to the commonly
accepted fact that child pornography offends traditional ideas regarding
sexuality and social norms. 16 The criminalization of child pornography
is also a response to the level and persistence of trauma in the children

5

See Lina Acca Mathew, Online Child Safety from Sexual Abuse in India, 2009 J. INFO., L.
& TECH. (May 28, 2009), available at www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2009_1/mathew.
6
See United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 603 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (stating that child
pornography is by definition a “permanent record” of a child’s sexual abuse).
7
Id.
8
Melissa Wells et al., Defining Child Pornography: Law Enforcement Dilemmas in
Investigations of Internet Child Pornography Possession, 8 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 269, 271 (2007),
available at unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV96.pdf.
9
See KERRY SHELDON & DENNIS HOWITT, SEX OFFENDERS AND THE INTERNET 9 (2007).
10
Id.
11
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996) (“Congress finds that . . . where children are used in its production, child pornography
permanently records the victim’s abuse, and its continued existence causes the child victims of
sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those children in future years . . . .”).
12
Lorelei Laird, Pricing Amy: Should Those Who Download Child Pornography Pay the
Victims?, A.B.A.J. (Sept. 2012), available at www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/
pricing_amy_should _those_who_download_child_pornography_pay_the_victims/ (providing an
example of a victim who was contacted and stalked by the possessors of her image).
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (S.D. Ohio 2011).
15
See YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 9 (2008).
16
See Stephen T. Fairchild, Note, Protecting the Least of These: A New Approach to Child
Pornography Pandering Provisions, 57 DUKE L.J. 163, 172 (“Congress, recognizing the established
norms of the American public, enacted laws relating to child pornography to give meaningful
enforcement to morally and empirically based attitudes against the viewing and dissemination of
such material and in favor of protecting the children involved in its production.”).
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who are sexually abused on camera for the purpose of creating the
images. 17
Despite such widespread criminalization, there is currently no
uniform definition of what constitutes child pornography. 18 Federal laws
define child pornography as generally inclusive of images of persons
under the age of eighteen engaged in sexually explicit behavior. 19
Sexually explicit behavior can include a range of conduct such as sexual
intercourse, sexual touching, bestiality or lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area. 20 The term “sexually explicit behavior” has been
interpreted broadly such that the definition of child pornography may
differ between jurisdictions. 21 However, the common thread in defining
child pornography is that images must depict minor children engaged in
sexual activities. 22
The Internet has increased both the amount of child pornography
that is created 23 and the amount of trauma that the image may cause in its
victim. 24 Now that images of child pornography can be uploaded and
passed from user to user, victims face the possibility that their images
will be viewed by thousands of people over many years. 25 Though
particular sites can be forced to remove such images through an
injunction, files can always be stored and copied for redistribution. 26
Individual victims have no power over their own images—once online,
the victim cannot force removal. 27 This continuous circulation of the
images causes many victims to feel as if the abuse is never really over, as
their right to privacy is violated again and again. 28 These victims are
17

See What Are the Effects of Sexual Abuse?, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N,
www.apa.org/releases/sexabuse/effects.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013); INT’L CTR. FOR MISSING &
EXPLOITED CHILDREN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: MODEL LEGISLATION & GLOBAL REVIEW i (2008),
available at www.missingkids.com/en_US/documents/CP_Legislation_Report.pdf.
18
Wells et al., supra note 8, at 271.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 9 (2006), available at www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications
/e04062000.pdf.
24
See What Are the Effects of Sexual Abuse?, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N,
www.apa.org/releases/sexabuse/effects.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).
25
See Mark Motivans & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation
Offenders, 2006, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, Dec. 2007, at 2, available at
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf.
26
See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 3, at 33.
27
See Jennifer Rothman, Note, Getting What They Are Owed: Restitution Fees for Victims of
Child Pornography, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 333, 337 (2011).
28
Id.
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often traumatized and may require tremendous financial resources for the
treatment required to overcome the trauma. 29 As one victim reported:
I wonder if the people I know have seen these images. I wonder if the
men I pass at the grocery store have seen them. Because the most
intimate parts of me are being viewed by thousands of strangers and
traded around, I feel out of control . . . It feels like I am being raped by
each and every one of them. 30

In an effort to ensure that victims of child pornography will have
access to the resources necessary for appropriate treatment, Congress
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2259 as part of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994. 31 This section of the Act mandates restitution for all losses
suffered by children who have been abused in the creation and
distribution of child pornography. 32 Though the application of this
statute is straightforward when the defendant was a party to the creation

29

See, e.g., United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2,

2009).
30
Robert William Jacques, Note, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal Restitution
Framework for Child Pornography Victims, 45 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1169 (2011) (quoting United
States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009)).
31
18 U.S.C. § 2259 provides:

(a) In General.—Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, . . . the court shall order restitution
for any offense under this chapter.
(b) Scope and Nature of Order. —
(1) Directions. —The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant to pay
the victim . . . the full amount of the victim’s losses as determined by the court pursuant to
paragraph (2).
(2) Enforcement. —An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in
accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under 3663A.
(3) Definition. —For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of the victim’s
losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for—
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.
(4) Order mandatory. —(A) The issuance of a restitution order under this section is
mandatory.
(B) A court may not decline to issue an order under this section because of—
(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or
(ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for his or her injuries
from the proceeds of insurance or any other source.
(c) Definition. —For purposes of this section, the term “victim” means the individual harmed
as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter . . . .
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (Westlaw 2012).
Id.

32
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of the images, courts have disagreed on whether the statute also demands
that those who later obtain and distribute the pornographic images must
also pay restitution. 33
Recently, the Ninth Circuit took up the restitution issue in United
States v. Kennedy. 34 When defendant Kennedy returned from an
overseas trip, he passed through the Seattle-Tacoma Airport. 35 There,
searches of his laptop revealed more than five thousand images of child
pornography. 36 At trial, Kennedy was convicted of both possession and
transportation of the images. 37 As part of his sentence, he was ordered to
pay restitution to two of the victims who were identified: Amy and
Vicky. 38 Kennedy appealed the restitution order and the Ninth Circuit
held that the lower court had erred in ordering that restitution be paid, for
three reasons. 39 First, proximate cause was a necessary element to such
awards. 40 Second, proximate cause between the defendant’s possession
of the images and the victims’ injuries was too attenuated to justify
restitution. 41 Third, the amount of damages awarded to the victims was
arbitrary, in part because proximate cause had not been established. 42
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in United States v.
Kennedy by vacating restitution damages for the victims to be paid by the
possessor of their images, because denying victims such restitution
offends traditional understandings of the limits of proximate cause 43 and
the legislative intent behind § 2259. 44 There are alternative legal tests
currently used by other circuits that establish proximate cause in childpornography-possessor cases that the Ninth Circuit should have applied
in Kennedy to ensure that those responsible for harming children would
not escape due liability. 45

33
See, e.g., United States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D. Me. 2009); United States v.
Renga, No. 1:08-CR-0270, 2009 WL 2579103, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009).
34
United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1265 (9th Cir. 2011).
35
Id. at 1252.
36
Id. at 1253.
37
Id. at 1254.
38
Id. at 1256.
39
Id. at 1263-64.
40
Id. at 1263.
41
Id. at 1264.
42
Id. at 1265.
43
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
44
See, e.g., United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is clear that
Congress intended to provide victims of sexual abuse with expansive relief for ‘the full amount of . .
. [their] losses’ suffered as a result of abuse.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(B), adding emphasis
and making alterations)).
45
United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 613-14 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
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Part I of this Note explains why the possession of child pornography
falls within the scope of § 2259, which requires mandatory restitution
awards for victims. Part II explains why the majority of courts have
found that proximate cause is necessary before such awards can be
ordered. Part III explores the existing circuit split regarding whether
proximate cause can be established in cases where a defendant is a mere
possessor of child pornography and describes the various tests for
establishing such cause. Part IV provides the facts and procedural
history of United States v. Kennedy and explains the reasoning behind
the court’s decision to overturn the restitution order. Part V argues that
the Ninth Circuit erred in its holding in Kennedy because proximate
cause was established in the case and that the amount of restitution
sought was proper under § 2259.
I. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSION FALLS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
§ 2259
The Mandatory Restitution for Sex Crimes section of the Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 46 requires that all victims of acts of sexual
abuse receive restitution. 47 The term “restitution” refers to monetary
compensation paid to the victim of a crime by the person convicted of
the crime. 48 Under federal law, the amount of restitution paid to the
victim should cover the full extent of losses suffered by the victim as a
result of the crime. 49
Until recently, the application of this statute suggested that
restitution could be ordered only against offenders who had personally
recorded or participated in the sexual abuse of children. 50 This changed
when two victims of child pornography, known only by the pseudonyms
Amy and Vicky, sought criminal restitution in a series of cases,
demanding that courts consider whether such restitution is also
appropriate if the defendant was not a part of the original sexual abuse of
the victim, but had later possessed or participated in the distribution of
images of child pornography. 51 In 2009, Amy was granted her first
restitution award from a possessor of an image of her childhood sexual

46

Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(a) (Westlaw 2012).
Id.
48
18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012).
49
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990).
50
See John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2010, at A19, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/03offender.html.
51
United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1110 (N.D. Iowa 2010).
47
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abuse. 52 Amy’s attorney has brought hundreds of similar cases to nearly
every district court in the country, with varying levels of success. 53 In
United States v. Kennedy, both Amy and Vicky requested restitution
based on defendant Kennedy’s possession of their images.54
The language of § 2259 supports the proposition that restitution is
mandatory for the possessors of child pornography. The possession of
child pornography is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. 55 Section 2259
states that it applies to “any offense under this chapter,” 56 which includes
§ 2252. 57 Thus, § 2259 should make restitution mandatory for those who
violate § 2252 by possessing images of child pornography. Further,
since the offense of possession falls within the scope of § 2259, the
defendant is required to pay the “full amount of the victim’s losses.” 58
The language of § 2259 also states that restitution must be paid in
accordance with the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 59 the
general federal restitution statute that defines the ways in which a federal
court may administer an award of restitution. 60 The Act gives the
government the option to seek restitution from a defendant based on a
request by the victim. 61 Though the government is not required to seek
restitution in every case, the law dictates that if the government seeks
restitution, judges have no discretion in the decision of whether to award
restitution. 62 If a defendant is convicted of an applicable offense that has
caused some damage to the victim, restitution is mandated. 63 Thus, the
only issues pertaining to restitution awards are whether a victim can
prove that a possessor of their image has actually caused the victim’s
52

See Rothman, supra note 27, at 335 (citing United States v. Hesketh, No. 3:08-CR-00165
(D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2009)).
53
See Robert William Jacques, Note, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal
Restitution Framework for Child Pornography Victims, 45 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1171-72 (2011)
(describing the efforts of Amy in collecting restitution from the possessors of her images); Casey
Knaupp, Attorney for Victim Asks for $3.4 Million, TYLER MORNING TELEGRAPH, Aug. 21, 2009, at
A1, available at uk.legal.narkive.com/hvcrPme5/commercial-child-porn-in-the-usa-mediated-bythe-courts.
54
United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1265 (9th Cir. 2011).
55
18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Westlaw 2012) (knowingly possessing or knowingly
accessing with intent to view child pornography).
56
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(a) (Westlaw 2012); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251 pt. 1, ch. 110 (Westlaw
2012).
57
Id.
58
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(3).
59
18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(e) (Westlaw 2012).
60
See Jacques, supra note 53, at 1183-84 (explaining the purpose behind § 3664 of
“harmonizing” federal restitution procedures).
61
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(d)(1).
62
18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1).
63
Id.
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losses, and whether the court can calculate these losses to a reasonable
certainty. 64
II. THE MAJORITY OF COURTS HAVE FOUND THAT § 2259 REQUIRES
PROXIMATE CAUSE FOR AN AWARD OF RESTITUTION
Despite evidence that children are irrevocably injured by the
distribution of child pornography, some courts have found that because a
possessor generally does not take part in the original abuse of the child,
he or she can be only tenuously linked to the harm. 65 Thus, courts
attempting to award restitution to victims under § 2259 must determine
whether these offenders can be considered to have legally caused the
harm suffered. 66
Generally, there are two types of causation that a court will
consider when determining whether an offender has caused the losses of
a crime victim. First, the court must determine if the offender’s actions
were a “but-for” cause of the victim’s injuries. 67 But-for causation exists
when, if not for the defendant’s actions, the victim would not have been
harmed. 68 One example would be a shooting where the victim dies—but
for the defendant shooting the victim, the victim would not have died.
Thus, the shooter is the “but-for cause” of the victim’s death.
There is also a second type of causation known as proximate
cause, when the offender’s actions were a substantial cause of the
victim’s losses, such that the defendant should be held liable to the
victim under the law. 69 The most common test for proximate cause
involves foreseeability. 70 Foreseeability hinges on whether the harm
resulting from an action could reasonably be predicted by the one who
caused the harm. 71 For instance, it is foreseeable that throwing a
baseball at someone could cause him or her a blunt-force injury.
Proximate cause is interrupted if there is a supersedingintervening event between the offender’s actions and the victim’s losses
that breaks the chain of causation. 72 A superseding-intervening event is
a cause of harm that could not have been reasonably predicted by the

64

See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 689 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 (N.D. Iowa 2010).
United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).
66
Id.
67
See, e.g., Washington & Georgetown R. Co. v. Hickey, 166 U.S. 521, 525 (1897).
68
Id.
69
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
65
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defendant. 73 For instance, suppose the defendant poked an associate in
the chest during a friendly discussion around a water cooler, and the
associate subsequently jumped out a window. This unusual reaction may
be deemed a superseding-intervening event that relieves the defendant of
blame for the co-worker’s death because there is no way the defendant
could reasonably have predicted such a reaction.
Courts deciding whether possessors of child pornography owe
restitution to children depicted in the images have differed regarding
whether proximate cause is necessary for an award under § 2259. 74 The
majority of courts have held that proximate cause must be found before a
victim can collect restitution from an offender. 75 Courts holding this
majority view have cited language under § 2259 that seems to support a
requirement of proximate cause for all damages incurred by victims of
child pornography. 76 Such courts also cite to the legislative intent behind
the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 77 and the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, both of which clarified the mandatory
nature of all federal restitution including the type awarded under §
2259. 78
In determining that the statutory construction of § 2259 includes a
requirement of proximate cause for all types of damages, courts have
73

Id. at 99 (majority opinion).
Compare United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov.
24, 2009) (“[Section] 2259 does not clearly demand a ‘proximate cause’ standard.”), with United
States v. Berk, 666 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (D. Me. 2009) (“[T]he plain language of [§ 2259] clearly
requires that losses—to be recoverable in restitution—must have been proximately caused by the
acts which constitute the offense of conviction.”). See also Jacques, supra note 53, at 1183-84.
75
See Jacques, supra note 53, at 1178 (explaining that although the majority of circuits have
found a requirement of proximate cause within § 2259, the Fifth Circuit has rejected both the
argument that proximate cause is a requirement for all types of losses defined in § 2259 and the
argument that the legislative history behind federal statutes supports the proximate-cause
requirement); see also In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 768 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (by express
terms of § 2259, proximate-cause requirement applies only in determining “any other losses”
suffered by victim under § 2259(b)(3)(F), but not for any other losses enumerated in § 2259(b)(3)).
76
See, e.g., United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Section 2259 . . .
incorporates a requirement of proximate causation: It states that the defendant shall pay ‘restitution
for any offense’ to the ‘victim’ of the offense. It defines a ‘victim’ as ‘the individual harmed as a
result of a commission of a crime under this chapter,’ and states that restitution shall compensate for
‘the full amount of the victim’s losses . . . .’” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(1), (c))).
77
See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)); S. REP. NO.
97-532, at 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2516 (explaining that the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982 was enacted in part to provide mandatory restitution awards to
victims of certain offenses).
78
See Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663A); S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 18 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931 (explaining congressional “intent that courts order full restitution to all
identifiable victims of covered offenses”).
74
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cited to § 2259(b)(3). 79 This subsection enumerates common types of
losses suffered by victims. 80 This subsection broadens the types of
losses subject to restitution by providing that restitution should include
“any costs incurred by the victim for . . . any other losses suffered by the
victim as a proximate result of the offense.” 81 This language ensures that
all losses suffered by victims of exploitation can be compensated by
restitution. 82 It is within this subsection that courts have read a
proximate cause requirement for all types of losses under the statute. 83
Though the actual words, “proximate cause” in § 2259(b)(3)
directly precede only the description of “any other losses,” the concept
of ejusdem generis 84 has resolved this issue for some courts. 85 Ejusdem
generis is a doctrine of interpretation that provides, “When several words
are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and
other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language
demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.” 86 Courts reading §
2259 according to the doctrine of ejusdem generis have found the
proximate cause requirement between the crime and resulting injury is
applicable to all types of losses, not just those specifically listed. 87
Further justification for a proximate cause requirement under §
2259 has been based on an examination of the legislative intent behind
federal mandatory restitution laws in general. 88 The legislative intent
behind other mandatory restitution laws is relevant to the debate
regarding § 2259 due to Congress’ efforts to create a uniform system of
federal restitution law that can be applied consistently to many types of
crimes. 89 To be considered a “victim” under federal mandatory
restitution law, one must have been “directly and proximately harmed as
a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be
79

See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125-26 (3d Cir. 1999).
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(3)(A-E) (Westlaw 2012).
81
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(3)(F).
82
Id.
83
See United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1208 (3d Cir. 2011).
84
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 594 (9th ed. 2009). Ejusdem generis is used to interpret
loosely written statutes. If a law lists specific classes of persons or things and then refers to them in
general, the general statements apply only to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed.
For example, if a law refers to automobiles, trucks, tractors, motorcycles and other motor-powered
vehicles, “vehicles” would not include airplanes, since the list was of land-based transportation.
85
McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1208.
86
Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345 (1920).
87
McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1208; see also What Are the Effects of Sexual Abuse?, AM.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, www.apa.org/releases/sexabuse/effects.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013)
(listing those types of losses enumerated by § 2259(b)(3)).
88
United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 609 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting S. REP. NO.
104-179, at 19 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 932).
89
Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
80
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ordered.” 90 Although these laws are similar to § 2259 because they
require restitution for crime victims, they cover crimes other than child
pornography. 91
By examining both the language of § 2259 and the overarching
policies that guide federal restitution law in general, most courts have
ruled that § 2259 requires that a victim show proximate cause between an
offense and his or her injuries before he or she will be granted restitution
from the offender. 92 However, this is not the only causation requirement
at issue in the discussion of whether possessors of child pornography are
liable for restitution. Though the issue of whether proximate cause is
necessary in these situations has been largely settled, there is still a
circuit split as to whether such cause can ever be established in cases
where the offender is a mere possessor of child pornography.
III. COURTS DISAGREE AS TO WHETHER A MERE POSESSOR OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY CAN BE HELD TO HAVE PROXIMATELY CAUSED A
VICTIM’S INJURY UNDER § 2259
Though most courts see proximate cause as a requirement of §
2259, courts are divided on the issue of proximate cause in regard to
child-pornography-possessor cases. 93 Some courts have ruled that
restitution cannot be granted in this type of case because the link between
the defendant’s possession of the images and the victim’s injuries is
simply too remote. 94 Other courts have ruled that proximate cause does
exist in these cases and that restitution should therefore be granted. 95
Courts that have ruled in favor of granting restitution in childpornography-possessor cases emphasize the fact that the language of §
2259 states that all a victim must do is prove that he or she has suffered a
harm in order to receive restitution. 96 Once any harm is established, the
90

18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663(a)(2), 3663A(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012); see also Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d

at 606.
91

Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1263 (9th Cir. 2011).
93
See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
94
See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1265 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Rowe, No. 1:09-CR-80, 2010 WL 3522257, at *1-5 (S.D.N.C Sept. 7, 2010); United States v. Van
Brackle, No. 2:08-CR-042-WCO, 2009 WL 4928050 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 2009).
95
See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 768 (5th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012) (en banc) (by
express terms of § 2259, proximate-cause requirement applies only in determining “any other losses”
suffered by victim under § 2259(b)(3)(F), but not for any other losses enumerated in § 2259(b)(3));
United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Baxter, 394 F.
App’x 377, 378 (9th Cir. 2010).
96
See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 768; McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1206; Baxter, 394 F.
App’x at 378.
92
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proximate cause requirement is met and an award of restitution becomes
mandatory, regardless of exactly how much of the victim’s harm can be
attributed directly to the actions of the defendant. 97
Two explanations have emerged as to why the mere possession of
child pornography is a proximate cause of the victims’ injuries. The first
approach uses the “substantial-factor” test to show that the defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in the victim’s overall harm. 98 The
second approach uses the “harm-within-the-risk” test, which focuses on
an offender’s ability to foresee that his actions are likely to cause a
specific harm to the victim. 99
A. THE SUBSTANTIAL-FACTOR TEST
To establish proximate cause under the substantial-factor test, it
must be proven that the defendant’s conduct was a “significant
contributing factor” to the victim’s emotional damage and resulting
financial losses. 100 For example, in United States v. Hardy, the
defendant was convicted of distributing, receiving, and possessing child
pornography. 101 The defendant took no part in the original abuse of the
victim and obtained the images years after their creation. 102 The court
found that the child depicted in the pornographic images would still have
been harmed whether the defendant had chosen to possess and distribute
her images or not. 103 However, the court also found that the defendant’s
behavior aided in the circulation of the victim’s picture. 104 This
circulation harmed the victim psychologically, a harm that could not be
separated from the original psychological injury. 105
Though the
defendant’s actions happened well after the initial injury, they were still
found to have proximately caused some portion of the overall injury.106
Thus, the defendant’s actions, though not the only cause, were a
substantial factor in the harm. 107

97
See, e.g., In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d at 768; McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1206; Baxter, 394 F.
App’x at 378.
98
United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 614 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
99
United States v. Church, 701 F. Supp. 2d 814, 830 (W.D. Va. 2010).
100
United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 126 (3d Cir. 1999).
101
Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 614.
107
Id. at 613.
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B. THE HARM-WITHIN-THE-RISK TEST
The harm-within-the-risk test was established in section 29 of the
Third Restatement of Torts. 108 The test asks “whether there is an
intuitive relationship between the act(s) alleged and the damages at issue
(that is, whether the conduct was wrongful because that type of damage
might result).” 109 For example, in United States v. Monzel, the court
determined that victims of child pornography suffer from additional
harm after the fact of their original sexual abuse and that the risk of this
harm is inherent within the offense of child pornography possession. 110
Courts that apply this test rely on the congressional intent behind § 2259
to compensate victims to justify a more relaxed approach to establishing
proximate cause in these cases, making a test based on the reasonable
connection between a defendant’s actions and implied harm to the victim
appropriate. 111

IV. UNITED STATES V. KENNEDY
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 9, 2007, Joshua Osmun Kennedy was arrested at
the Seattle-Tacoma Airport when officials found over five thousand
images of child pornography on his laptop computer. 112 Kennedy was
convicted of possessing and distributing images of child pornography in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 113 and sentenced to sixty months in prison
followed by a fifteen-year period of supervised, conditional release. 114
Further, the court ordered that Kennedy pay restitution under § 2259 to
two of the victims whose images had been found on his computer: Amy
and Vicky. 115 The government sought restitution in the total amount of
$3,000,000 for Amy and $227,000 for Vicky on a theory of joint and
several liability, or, alternatively, one thousand dollars for each image
possessed by the defendant. 116 The defendant asked that the court not
108

United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2010).
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (2010)).
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2011).
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1254.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1255.
109
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award restitution to either of the two women, claiming that the
government had failed to show that an award of restitution under § 2259
was justified in this case because proximate cause between Kennedy’s
actions and the injuries of the victims had not been established. 117 The
trial court found that proximate cause did exist and that one thousand
dollars per image was fair. 118 The court awarded $17,000 to Amy and
$48,000 to Vicky—one thousand dollars for each image of each
victim. 119
Kennedy appealed the trial court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit
on several grounds. 120 First, he claimed that the court erred in allowing
the testimony of five law enforcement officers involved in the
investigation of the original sexual abuse of the underage victims
depicted in the images found on Kennedy’s computer. 121 Second,
Kennedy claimed that the court abused its discretion when it imposed the
fifteen-year period of supervised release. 122 Third, Kennedy appealed
the court’s restitution order, claiming that the government had failed to
prove that restitution was warranted under the statute because the
government had not shown any cause between the victims’ losses and
Kennedy’s possession of the pornography. 123
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING REGARDING THE INVALIDITY
OF THE RESTITUTION ORDER
In an opinion written by Judge Sandra Segal Ikuta, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed Kennedy’s conviction and his sentence, but vacated the
restitution order. 124 The court held that while the inclusion of the
testimony of the officers and the imposition of supervised release were
both proper exercises of judicial discretion, the restitution order was
improper due to the government’s failure to establish that Kennedy’s
mere possession of the images was a proximate cause of Amy and
Vicky’s suffering. 125 This section discusses the Kennedy court’s holding
regarding the restitution order, which was based on its finding that the
defendant’s actions were not a but-for or proximate cause of harm to the

117

Id.
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 1256.
124
Id. at 1258, 1261.
125
Id.
118
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victims and that the amount of restitution damages awarded by the trial
court was arbitrary. 126
1. The Requirements of the Mandatory Restitution for Sex Crimes
Section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
The trial court in United States v. Kennedy derived its authority to
grant the restitution orders for Amy and Vicky from § 2259. 127 This
section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 requires mandatory
restitution for victims of sexual abuse. 128 The Ninth Circuit began its
analysis of that authority with a thorough examination of the language of
the statute. 129 The court found that § 2259 makes restitution mandatory
in cases involving the sexual abuse and exploitation of children and that
such orders must “direct the defendant to pay the victim . . . the full
amount of the victim’s losses.” 130
In defining the term “victim” for the purposes of restitution, the
court turned to previous Ninth Circuit rulings regarding the proximate
cause requirement under other federal restitution statutes, specifically the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) 131 and the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA). 132 The court
found it appropriate to analogize § 2259 with these laws because §
2259(b)(2) states that all restitution orders must be “issued and enforced
in accordance with” all sections of the VWPA and the MVRA. 133 The
VWPA and the MVRA define victims as those whose harms are both
but-for and proximately caused by a defendant’s actions. 134 The court
adopted this definition of “victim” along with the requirements of both
but-for and proximate causation. 135
Next, the court turned to the issue of how closely connected the
harm must be to a defendant’s actions in order to constitute proximate
cause for restitution under § 2259. 136 To determine the scope of the
proximate cause requirement, the court once again relied on previous

126

Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1255.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 1260.
130
Id. at 1255.
131
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664 (Westlaw 2012).
132
18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A (Westlaw 2012).
133
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1258.
134
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1512-1515, 3663-3664.
135
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1260.
136
Id. at 1258.
127
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Ninth Circuit case law developed from the VMPA and MVPA. 137 The
court cited a range of its own prior decisions on the issue of how
attenuated the harm may be from a defendant’s action before proximate
cause will be destroyed in criminal cases. 138 The court found that such
decisions must walk a “middle ground.” 139 That is, a loss cannot be too
remote from an action if restitution is to be granted, but it may be at least
one step removed from the action without destroying proximate cause. 140
The Ninth Circuit then sought to find that middle ground. 141 It
began by citing United States v. Keith. 142 In that case, the court found
that an intervening cause between a crime and a harm did not disqualify
a victim from being compensated for that loss because the intervening
cause was directly related to the offensive conduct. 143 The court gave the
example of such an intervening cause from United States v. Gamma Tech
Industries, Inc. 144 In that case, a navy contractor took kickbacks in
exchange for hiring certain subcontractors. 145 This practice caused
contractors not involved in the scheme to lose money, because the
subcontractors who did give kickbacks were able to charge inflated
prices for the contracts they received. 146 Though the victims’ losses had
been greatly increased by the inflated charges of the subcontractors and
not the offender himself, the contractor was still ordered to pay the
victims the full amount of their losses. 147 Since the hiring of
subcontractors was directly related to the offense, the court ruled that the
defendant was liable for the losses caused by the intervening
subcontractor conduct. 148 Though there was more than one cause of the
victims’ losses in that case, the defendant was still liable because his
conduct was considered one of the material and proximate causes of the
losses, though it was not the sole or total cause. 149
After its review of cases examining the requirements of restitution
in other federal courts and examining its own precedent, the court held
that proximate cause is necessary for any and all awards of restitution for

137

Id. at 1259; see also 18 U.S.C.A §§ 1512-1515, 3663A, 3663-3664.
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1259.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1262.
142
Id. (citing United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1985)).
143
Keith, 754 F.2d at 1392.
144
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1262.
145
Id.
146
United States v. Gamma Tech Indus., Inc., 265 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2001).
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
138
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crimes that fall under § 2259, whatever type of losses were incurred. 150
The court stated that proximate cause exists only when there is a causal
connection between the conduct of the defendant and the specific losses
of a victim. 151 Although there may be multiple steps separating the
conduct from the loss, the conduct must not be so attenuated from the
resulting harm that it would be unreasonable to hold the defendant
responsible. 152 Lastly, there must be some degree of certainty about
what the victim has lost before she or he can be compensated. 153 Losses
need not be calculated with mathematical precision, but they cannot be
arbitrary. 154 The court held that all of these requirements must be met
for an award of restitution to be proper under § 2259. 155
2.

The Ninth Circuit Overturned the Restitution Award

In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit held that before a court can award
restitution under § 2259, the victim must show that he or she was truly a
victim of the crime, that the offense was indeed a proximate cause of the
victim’s losses, and that the victim’s losses are reasonably certain. 156 On
the first element—whether Amy and Vicky were victims of Kennedy’s
offense—the court determined that they were. 157 The court found that
ample evidence had been submitted at trial through victim impact
statements to prove that the women had been harmed by Kennedy’s
possession of their images, even if they never knew that Kennedy in
particular had possessed their images. 158
However, the court also found that Kennedy did not proximately
cause the injuries suffered by the women. 159 The trial court had found
that the victims’ knowledge of the existence of the images and their
knowledge that unidentified people were viewing them caused the
victims severe emotional stress leading to acute psychological
problems. 160 These problems and the high costs of treatment were
recognized as specific harms to the victims. 161 The trial court thus held
150

Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1263; see also Gamma Tech, 265 F.3d at 928.
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1262.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 1260.
155
Id. at 1263.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
See id. at 1256.
161
See id. at 1260.
151
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that Kennedy, as one of the many people possessing the images, was
both a but-for and proximate cause of this harm because he was part of a
larger action that was the cause of a specific harm. 162 The Ninth Circuit,
however, found that this evidence did not demonstrate a specific harm
caused by Kennedy, but only the larger harm caused by all of the people
downloading, possessing, and distributing the images of child
pornography. 163
The Kennedy court admitted that it had, in earlier decisions, held
that restitution could be awarded when the defendant’s offense “was
merely one part of a larger problem that caused the victim’s losses.” 164
However, the court distinguished Kennedy by pointing out that earlier
cases had strong evidence showing that the defendants’ actions had
directly contributed to the victims’ losses. 165 For instance, in the case of
a fraudulent real estate scheme, the court found that the head of the
fraudulent endeavor was liable for all the losses suffered due to a high
rate of foreclosures, despite the defendant’s argument that the
foreclosures had been caused by the independent financial circumstances
of homebuyers and not his crime. 166 The court held the defendant liable
because the crime itself was evidence that his conduct was a direct cause
of the losses, though his fraud was not the only cause of the losses. 167
The court found such evidence to be lacking in Kennedy. 168 The court
held that without proof that Kennedy in particular had caused some
separate and discernable harm to Amy and Vicky, he could not be held
accountable for any of the harm the women had suffered. 169 Thus, the
court rejected the government’s theory that Kennedy was the proximate
cause of the victims’ injuries for the purpose of a restitution award. 170
The court also found that the losses of the victims could not be
calculated with reasonable certainty. 171 It found no proof that the
government’s determination that an award of one thousand dollars per
image would fairly compensate the victims for the “full amount of [their]
losses.” 172 The government attempted to address this by asking the court

162

Id.
Id. at 1264.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. (citing United States v. Peterson, 538 F.3d 1064, 1077 (9th Cir. 2008)).
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
163
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to award restitution under a theory of joint and several liability. 173 The
court rejected that theory, finding that it did nothing to cure the fact that
there was no evidence connecting Kennedy’s actions and the victims’
specific harms. 174 The court determined that it would be impossible to
hold Kennedy responsible for any harm unless there was some evidence
that his downloading of the images had caused an injury that was
somehow separate and distinct from the rest of the harms suffered due to
the creation and distribution of the images. 175 Since they did not see any
proof of such harm in this case, the court overturned the trial court’s
restitution order. 176

V.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED WHEN IT OVERTURNED THE
RESTITUTION ORDER, BECAUSE PROXIMATE CAUSE EXISTED,
AND THE AWARD WAS APPROPRIATE UNDER § 2259
In the Kennedy opinion, the court stated in the final paragraphs:
[W]e suspect that § 2259’s proximate cause and reasonable calculation
requirements will continue to present serious obstacles for victims
seeking restitution in these sorts of cases. Nevertheless, the
responsibility lies with Congress, not the courts, to develop a scheme
to ensure that defendants . . . are held liable for the harms they cause
through their participation in the market for child pornography. 177

The reasoning behind the court’s reluctance to award restitution in
child pornography cases is that there is a proximate cause requirement
within § 2259 that precludes victims from collecting damages for any
losses that are not directly caused by the offense. 178 The Ninth Circuit
found that there is no way to prove that a possessor of child pornography
has directly caused the losses of children featured in pornographic
images. 179 Further, even if such a thing could be proven, there would
still be no way to quantify how much damage each possessor had
individually caused. 180 The court found that the inability to separate and
determine specific damage caused by an individual defendant is an
173

Id. at 1265.
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 1264.
177
Id. at 1266.
178
See id. at 1265.
179
Id.
180
Id.
174
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insurmountable obstacle to restitution because restitution must be based
on a reasonable calculation of a victim’s losses. 181
The Kennedy court’s logic is flawed in two important aspects.
First, there are tests used by other courts that establish proximate cause
in child-pornography-possessor cases that allow specific damages to be
determined in situations where multiple offenders contribute to a mass
harm. 182 One of these is the substantial-factor test. 183 The Ninth Circuit
has already adopted “substantial factor” into the definition of proximate
cause in the torts context and it should have applied this theory to
criminal restitution, 184 because criminal restitution is determined by
applying torts concepts. 185 There is also the harm-within-the-risk test. 186
The Third Restatement of Torts has recently adopted this test within the
proper definition of proximate cause because it reduces confusion in
cases involving multiple causes. 187 This test is well-suited for use in
child-pornography-possessor cases because it does not require but-for
cause, instead apportioning liability based on the reasonable
foreseeability of harm. 188
Second, despite the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the amount of
restitution awarded in Kennedy was supported by § 2259 because it was
reasonable. 189 Though the nature of psychological damages makes it
difficult to assign an exact dollar amount to the victims’ losses, it is a
proper exercise of judicial discretion under § 2259 to set any dollar
amount so long as the amount is reasonable, 190 as it was in this case.
Further, nominal damages may be awarded even when there is no way to
determine the victims’ losses to a reasonable degree of certainty, 191
which supports the view that restitution damages are not directly tied to
what losses a victim can prove. 192 Under either of these theories of
181

Id.
See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 613-14 (W.D. Pa. 2010); United States v.
Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2010).
183
See Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
184
See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005).
185
See Matthew Spohn, Note, A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory Victim Restitution
Act’s Challenge to the Civil/Criminal Divide, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1013, 1015-16 (2001) (“[Criminal
restitution] is civil—in compensating victims for their specific losses, it resembles an attenuated tort
proceeding held during a pause in a criminal proceeding.”).
186
See Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
187
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 29 (2010).
188
Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
189
See United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 614-15 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (discussing the
ability of a court to approximate restitution damages based on the defendant’s role in the overall
harm to the victim).
190
Id. at 613.
191
United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (S.D. Ohio 2011).
192
Id.
182
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restitution, the amount awarded to the victims in Kennedy was
appropriate. 193
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the trial court’s restitution
order met the test for mandatory restitution because proximate cause
existed and because damages were supported by § 2259. 194 Given this,
the Ninth Circuit should have upheld the restitution order in Kennedy. 195
A. THERE WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE RESTITUTION
ORDER IN KENNEDY
The Ninth Circuit held that no proximate cause exists between the
possession of child pornography and the injuries suffered by the
victims. 196 However, courts in other circuits have developed tests that
show proximate cause can be established in child pornography
possession cases. 197 One of these tests is the substantial-factor test and
another is the harm-within-the-risk test. 198
1. The Ninth Circuit Should Have Used the Substantial-Factor Test
To Find Proximate Cause Between Child PornographyPossessors and the Harm Suffered by Their Victims
The substantial-factor test has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit
as a relevant test for establishing proximate cause in tort claims. 199
Though legally distinct from tort cases, criminal restitution claims are
decided using tort concepts. 200 The Ninth Circuit applied the traditional
tort concepts of proximate and but-for cause in its analysis of the validity
of the restitution order in Kennedy, 201 but dismissed the use of the
substantial-factor test in this context without discussion of why it would
opt to limit the definition of proximate cause in the specific context of
criminal law. 202 Without a specific reason for dismissing the use of the
previously adopted test, the court should have applied it because it is one

193

See id; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(4)(A) (Westlaw 2012).
See discussion infra Part V.A-B.
195
Id.
196
See United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1252 (9th Cir. 2011).
197
See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d 597, 613 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
198
See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
199
See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005).
200
See Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
201
See Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1261.
202
Id. at 1261.
194
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of the traditional methods for establishing proximate cause in cases
where there are multiple causes of harm. 203
Other courts have already applied the substantial-factor test in the
criminal context. 204 Though the Ninth Circuit has generally applied the
substantial-factor test only to tort claims, the substantial-factor test has
been used in federal district courts within the Third Circuit to establish
proximate cause in cases of child pornography possession like in
Kennedy. 205 Under the substantial-factor test, it must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s conduct was a
“significant contributing factor” to the victim’s emotional injuries. 206
For example, in United States v. Hardy, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that while the possession
of child pornography is not the only cause of injury to children depicted
in the images, it is a substantial factor in their harm. 207 Thus, the timing
of the initial abuse is not a superseding cause that will protect a child
pornography-possessor from liability. 208
This test is especially relevant to Kennedy because Kennedy’s
possession of the pictures was so removed in time from the original
sexual abuse of the victims. 209 In essence, the Kennedy court determined
that the damage to the victims had already been done by the time
Kennedy committed his offense. 210 The substantial-factor test, as
applied to cases such as Kennedy, illustrates that the possession of child
pornography does not need to be shown to have retroactively caused the
original injury. 211 The possession only needs to be shown to have caused
a substantial part of the overall harm suffered by the victim. 212 Child
pornography-possessors do cause a substantial portion of the harm
203
See Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (“[T]he ‘substantial factor’ test formulation . . . is one
means of accounting for the unusual situations where limiting proximate causation to a subset of but
for cause is inappropriate to the ends of justice.”).
204
Id. at 614.
205
Id. (explaining that a mere child pornography possessor is a substantial factor in the
victim’s harm because the possessor aided in the circulation of the images.)
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
See Jacques, supra note 53 at 1171-72 (describing the efforts of Amy in collecting
restitution from the possessors of her images); Knaupp, supra note 53 (explaining that the
pornographic images depicting Any and Vicky were taken decades ago when the women were young
children).
210
See United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1264 (9th Cir. 2011) (determining that the
defendant’s participation in the “audience” was not evidence that he had contributed to the losses
suffered by the women).
211
Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 612 (relying on United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir.
1999)).
212
Id.
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because the knowledge that the image is being viewed causes fresh
psychological pain and prevents a victim from ever truly moving past the
abuse. 213
In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the actions of
the defendant did cause a portion of the harm suffered by the victims, but
held that proximate cause could not be established because the harm was
not specific. 214 This means that the court could not find an injury that
was caused by Kennedy alone—an injury that was separate from the
injuries caused by all other possessors of the pornography. 215 The
substantial-factor test solves the problem of defining specific harm
through a concept known as “concurrent causes.” 216 Concurrent causes
occur when multiple people each do something “which would, on its
own, be sufficient to bring about the harm.” 217 For example, if two
people shoot a person at the same time and that person dies, then both of
these acts are considered to be the proximate cause of death, despite the
fact that the victim would have died of either wound independent of the
other. 218 Accordingly, the Kennedy court should have found that the
defendant’s possession of child pornography was a concurrent cause of
the victims’ harm despite the fact that the victims would have been
harmed even if Kennedy had never obtained their images. 219 By
acknowledging that Kennedy caused at least some of the harm to his
victims, the court established that Kennedy, like the defendant in Hardy,
was in fact a proximate cause of the injuries because his offense, though
certainly not the entire cause of the harm, was a substantial factor in his
victims’ injuries. 220 Thus, under its own definition of proximate cause,
the Ninth Circuit should have found proximate cause in this case. 221

213

See id. at 613; Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1263.
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1263.
215
Id.
216
See Hardy, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
See id.
220
See id. at 613.
221
See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The traditional notion of
‘but for’ causation is subsumed within the substantial factor test, whereby defendants’ actions may
be the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries if those actions were a substantial factor in bringing
them about.”).
214
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2. The Ninth Circuit Could Have Used the Harm-Within-the-Risk
Test To Find Proximate Cause Between the Possession of Child
Pornography and the Victims
Even if the Kennedy court determined that the substantial-factor
test was inappropriate, it still should have found proximate cause through
the harm-within-the-risk test adopted by the Third Restatement of
Torts, 222 applied in the criminal context by the United States District
Court of the District of Columbia in United States v. Monzel, 223 and
approved of in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in a review of that case. 224 Instead of focusing on
whether the defendant’s actions caused a substantial amount of harm to
the victims, this test asks whether the harm to the victim was a result of
the risk inherent in the defendant’s actions that made those actions illegal
in the first place. 225 This test has been used in circuits where the
substantial-factor test has fallen into disfavor. 226
Unlike the substantial-factor test, this test states that but-for cause
is not a requirement for establishing liability in all cases. 227 In cases
where there are “multiple sufficient causes”—in which the victim would
have suffered the same harm by others had the defendant not acted—butfor cause is inappropriate because a requirement of this type could
absolve all co-defendants of liability for their actions. 228 This would
make it impossible for victims to collect restitution from any of those
responsible for their injuries. Not providing an avenue toward victim
restitution in those circumstances would violate the intent of victim
restitution—that it be compensatory for victims as well as punitive to
defendants. 229
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has
held that the possession of child pornography does contain an inherent
risk of harm to the victims. 230 In United States v. Monzel, the defendantpossessor of child pornography was convicted of charges identical to

222
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 27, 29 (2010); United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp.
2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2010).
223
Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 87; see also Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 412 F. Supp. 2d 99,
111 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 531 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
224
See United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
225
Id. at 87.
226
See id. at 85.
227
Id. at 87.
228
Id. at 86-87.
229
Id. at 88 (citing S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,
925).
230
Id. at 87.
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those in Kennedy. 231 At trial, the defendant argued that there was no butfor causation in the case because the victim would have suffered the
same harm whether or not the defendant had possessed the images, based
on the fact that countless others had already possessed them. 232 The
Monzel court agreed with this, but determined that, according to the
harm-within-the-risk test, the defendant was still a proximate cause of
the victim’s injuries, despite the fact that he may not have been a direct
cause of the injuries. 233
The district court also determined that the risk inherent in the
mere possession of child pornography is sufficient to establish proximate
cause between such conduct and the damage caused to child pornography
victims. 234 The court cited to congressional findings noting that a
separate injury occurs each time a victim’s image is downloaded. 235 The
Monzel court stated that Congress’s awareness that such injuries occur
means that there is a risk of injury to victims that exists inherently within
the crime of child pornography possession. 236 Thus, when harm does
result, offenders must be held liable. 237 As discussed, the fact that many
people are committing the same crime does not absolve a defendant from
responsibility in cases where a victim has suffered in part due to the
defendant’s actions. 238 The but-for cause requirement is not meant to be
a shield to protect those who commit offenses along with many others. 239
Thus, in special cases like the possession of child pornography, the
harm-within-the-risk test provides the best way to assign liability to those
who are at fault. 240

231

Id. at 77.
Id. at 86.
233
Id. at 87.
234
Id. at 88.
235
See id. at 86 (“Although the victims may have been suffering from such fear and anxiety
prior to an individual defendant’s conduct, each notification of a defendant’s conduct perpetuates the
trauma, thereby prolonging recovery, and increasing harm to the victim.”).
236
Id. at 87.
237
See id. at 88 (“The ‘risk’ inherent in [defendant’s] participation in the child pornography
market by receiving and possessing such images therefore includes the risk that the children whose
abuse is depicted will suffer as a result.”).
238
Id. at 86-87.
239
Id.
240
Id.
232
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B. THE AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN KENNEDY WAS APPROPRIATE UNDER § 2259
The second major issue present within the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
of the restitution order in Kennedy was whether the amount of restitution
damages was appropriate under § 2259. 241 The trial court in Kennedy
awarded the victims one thousand dollars per image in Kennedy’s
possession. 242 The Ninth Circuit rejected this award amount as
arbitrary. 243 However, the court should have found that this amount was
reasonably connected to the losses suffered by the victims.

1. One Thousand Dollars Per Image Was Reasonable
Compensation for the Victims’ Losses in Kennedy Because §
2259 Grants Broad Judicial Discretion for Such Awards and the
Amount Was Based on the Actual Damages Suffered
Although courts have little discretion as to whether restitution
should be ordered when a defendant has been convicted of the possession
of child pornography, § 2259 defines restitution broadly to ensure that all
victims or sexual abuse are generously compensated. 244 In Kennedy, the
entirety of the damages sought was $3,000,000 for Amy and $227,000
for Vicky, but the trial court instead awarded one thousand dollars for
each image the defendant possessed. 245 The trial court made this
decision in the interest of reasonableness. 246
The language of § 2259 illustrates that the statute is meant to be
interpreted broadly, so long as the amount of restitution has some
connection to the damages and is not arbitrary. 247 Courts are not to
consider the financial circumstances of the defendant in determining a
reasonable amount of restitution, only the losses of the victims. 248
However, the statute also directs the award of restitution “as determined
by the court . . . in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as
241

United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1264 (9th Cir. 2011).
Id.
243
Id.
244
United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Congress mandated broad
restitution for a minor victim following an offender’s conviction of federal child sexual exploitation
and abuse offenses.”); United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Section 2259 is
phrased in generous terms, in order to compensate the victims of sexual abuse for the care required
to address the long term effects of their abuse.”).
245
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1255.
246
Id. at 1256.
247
Id. at 1260; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(3)(F) (Westlaw 2012).
248
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(4)(B)(i).
242
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an order under section 3663A.” 249 Under § 3664, which is the section
that determines the amounts for awards of restitution under § 3663A and
therefore under § 2259, the circumstances of a defendant matter in cases
where there is more than one defendant. 250 In such cases, the “court may
make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution
or may apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of
contribution to the victim’s loss and [the] economic circumstances of
each defendant.” 251 It is under this framework that the trial court in
Kennedy chose to limit the award amount to one thousand dollars per
image, believing that the full amount of the women’s losses would be
unfairly imposed on a defendant who had not caused all the losses since
many other people had downloaded pictures of the victims in addition to
Kennedy. 252
Further, the amount of one thousand dollars per image was not
arbitrary as the Ninth Circuit asserted. Kennedy caused harm each time
he downloaded a new image and continued the cycle of exploitation of
the victims. 253 Thus, linking the amount of restitution to the number of
images he downloaded is reasonable. Further, because his crime is likely
to result in additional therapy, lost wages, and medical expenses, one
thousand dollars for each image is consistent with the foreseeable
expenses of his victims. 254 Thus, the award was not arbitrary, and it was
directly related to the damage the defendant caused. Since proximate
cause is likely to have been established in this case, and since the
restitution award amount was reasonable and supported by the intent
behind § 2259, the Ninth Circuit erred when it decided that Amy and
Vicky were owed no restitution in this case.
2. The Award Amount in Kennedy Was Also Reasonable Under a
Theory of Nominal Damages
Even if the Ninth Circuit determined that the losses in Kennedy
could not be reasonably calculated, the victims were still owed nominal
249

18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(1).
18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663A, 3664(h) (Westlaw 2012); see also United States v. Sensmeier, 361
F.3d 982, 990 (7th Cir. 2004) (“When there is more than one defendant that has contributed to the
loss of a victim, district courts enjoy the option of either imposing full liability on each defendant or
apportioning the liability among the defendants to reflect the culpability . . . of each.”).
251
United States v. Zander, 319 F. App’x 146, 150 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3664(h)).
252
United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 2011).
253
See United States v. Monzel, 746 F. Supp. 2d 76, 87 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining the new
trauma that occurs with the distribution of child pornography).
254
See discussion supra Part V.B.1.
250
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damages. 255 In another child-pornography-possessor case, the United
States District Court of the Southern District of Ohio agreed with the
Ninth Circuit that there is a real harm caused to the victims of child
pornography. 256 However, unlike the Ninth Circuit, the court in United
States v. Klein found that at least nominal damages are required in such
cases, even if the court found that there was not enough evidence to
establish the full amount of a victim’s losses. 257 An award of nominal
damages for the victims of child pornography-possessors is supported by
the mandatory nature of § 2259, because it allows judges to award
damages as required by the statute in cases where multiple offenders
make it difficult to determine the exact amount of damages. 258 In a civil
context, nominal damages are generally a small amount of money
awarded to a plaintiff in a lawsuit to show she or he was right but has
suffered no significant losses. 259 In the child pornography-possessor
context, an award of nominal damages is a basis for the judge to assign
what he or she feels are reasonable damages under the circumstances. 260
In Klein, the court found that nominal damages in the amount of five
thousand dollars were reasonable restitution paid by a child
pornography-possessor to his victim. 261 The trial court in Kennedy
assigned a similarly low amount of restitution at one thousand dollars per
image. 262 The Ninth Circuit should have upheld this restitution award
because it was within the trial judge’s discretion under the theory of
nominal damages and reasonable under the circumstances. 263
CONCLUSION
It is not easy to determine the amount of harm caused to a child
each time a person downloads an image of the original abuse. 264 The
inability to assess how the harm from one offender is unique from the

255
See United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 607 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (“[W]here a party
‘establishes a wrong and actual loss therefrom, he or she is entitled to nominal damages at least . . .
where the evidence fails to show the extent of the resulting damages.’” (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages
§ 14 (2009)).
256
Id. at 607.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 607-08.
259
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (9th ed. 2009)
260
Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 607.
261
Id.
262
United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2011).
263
Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 607-08.
264
See discussion supra Part III.A-B; see also Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1260 (discussing
generally the fact that courts have differed about which techniques are appropriate for determining
restitution damages).
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harm of another offender played a large role in the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to overturn the restitution award in Kennedy. 265 However, the
Ninth Circuit did find that offenders who collect and view child
pornography do contribute to the harm suffered by these victims. 266
Thus, under the language of § 2259, it is mandatory that the court
quantify this harm in order to compensate the victims who must deal
perpetually with the scars of their abuse. 267 The Ninth Circuit’s decision
ignores the mandatory requirement of the statute in favor of an overly
strict interpretation of causation requirements that is not supported by
Ninth Circuit precedent or by the legislative intent behind § 2259. 268
Determining how much harm an offender should be liable for is
not impossible under § 2259. 269 The Ninth Circuit was correct in its
assessment that proximate cause must be established, but incorrect in its
limited definition of how that can be achieved. 270 The Ninth Circuit has
already accepted the use of the substantial-factor test in other contexts. 271
The court should have applied this test in this case to establish proximate
cause in Kennedy. 272 Other courts have used this test to find proximate
cause in child-pornography-possessor cases. 273 Even if the Ninth Circuit
determined that the substantial-factor test should not be extended,
alternative formulations for determining proximate cause, such as the
harm-within-the-risk test, could have been adopted in order to comply
with the mandatory nature of restitution. 274
The Supreme Court has recently denied certiorari on the issue of
proximate cause in child pornography cases. 275 This means that Kennedy
is, at least for the time being, the death knell for child pornography
restitution in the Ninth Circuit. Sadly, without such compensation, many
victims of child pornography will not have the resources to get the help
they need, and they will continue to suffer. If child pornography is ever
to be stopped, possessors must be made to take responsibility for their

265

Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1264.
Id. at 1260.
267
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259(b)(4)(A) (Westlaw 2012); see also United States v. Hardy, 707 F.
Supp. 2d 597, 613-14 (W.D. Pa. 2010).
268
See discussion supra Part V.A.
269
See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
270
See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
271
See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
272
See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
273
See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
274
See discussion supra Part III.A-B.
275
Jeffrey Brown, SCOTUS Denies Cert in Case on CP Victim Restitution, CYBERCRIME
REVIEW (Nov. 29, 2011), www.cybercrimereview.com/2011/11/scotus-denies-cert-in-case-on-cpvictim.html.
266
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actions. Further, if these victims can ever hope to be made whole, courts
must make compensating them a priority. If not, their futures may be
very dark indeed.
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